1. Dutch east indies was yet another state affected by the insurgence during the last few decennaries. The insurgence in Indonesia was preponderantly an cultural based motion led by Aceh guerilla had been their battle from 1976 to 2005. Aceh is thought to be the topographic point where Islam was foremost established in Southeast Asia and that has the highest figure of Muslims comparing to the other parts of Indonesia.
2. Indonesia is geographically located in and Southeast Asia. It lies between latitudes 11A°S and 6A°N, and longitudes 95A°E and 141A°E. It is an archipelago, consists with 17,508 islands and among them about 6,000 is inhabited. Entire land country of Indonesia is about 1,904,569 km2 and consist of 33 states with population over 238 million. Indonesia is the universe ‘s 4th populated state and it is a republic, with an elective legislative assembly and president. The Capital metropolis is Jakarta and the state portions its boundaries with Papua New Guinea, East Timor, and Malaysia.
3. It was under the Dutch regulation for about three and half centuries. Indonesia got its independency in 17 August 1945 and. Indonesia consists of 100s of distinguishable native cultural and lingual groups. Javanese are the largest and politically dominant cultural group. Religious freedom is recognized in the Indonesian fundamental law and Islam, Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism are officially recognized by the authorities. The official national linguistic communication of the state is Indonesian.
4. Aceh is a particular part of Indonesia, located at the northern terminal of Sumatra. It is close to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands of India. Aceh was foremost known as Aceh Darussalam ( 1511-1959 ) , Daerah Istimewa Aceh ( 1959-2001 ) , Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam ( 2001-2009 ) and Aceh ( 2009-present ) in different clip periods in the history. Province covers a land country around 57,956 kilometers and consists of four metropoliss and 19 administrative countries. Its capital is Banda Aceh. Relative to most parts of Indonesia, it is a sacredly conservative country with Islam being the predominant with 97
per cent. Aceh has a history of political independency and ferocious opposition to command by foreigners, including the Dutch settlers and the Indonesian authorities. This state has significant natural resources, including oil and universe largest natural gas militias.
5. After the transportation of authorization from Dutch Government to the Indonesian State in 1949, Aceh was amalgamated with the nearby state of North Sumatra, taking to resentment from many Acehnese due to cultural differences between themselves and the Christian Batak people who dominate North Sumatra. This bitterness resulted in a rebellion that led to yet another insurgence in post-colonial state in East Asia.
6. To analyse the lessons learnt in Aceh insurgence and do recommendation for future application in Counter Insurgency Operations.
BACK GROUND AND COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN
7. Aceh was one of the centres of a powerful trading imperium during the 16 and 17 centuries and one of the earliest Muslim sultanates in Southeast Asia. Peoples of Aceh have a long history of rebellion and opposition for external business. For 300 old ages, they thwarted the Dutch military attempts to “ lenify ” the part and integrate Aceh into colonial imperium. During the Indonesian war for independency with the Dutch in the late fortiess, Acehnese forces played a cardinal military function. However, many Acehnese had a different and conservative Islamic inspired vision of a post-independence Indonesia than the mainly secularist leaders based in Java. Despite discontent about both the deficiency of liberty for Aceh and about the non-Islamic character of Indonesia as a whole, the part became portion of the unitary Republic of Indonesia in 1950.
8. A few old ages after independency, resistance to the constitutional and political character of the Indonesia, started to emerge in Aceh, making a extremum when President Sukarno began to beat up himself with the Indonesian Communist Party ( PKI ) in the late fiftiess. In 1953, a motion to subvert the cardinal authorities developed in Aceh, associating up with the alleged Dar’ul Islam rebellion, a diverse aggregation of insurgent
Islamic groups throughout parts of Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Java. The leaders of this rebellion groups had no purpose of dividing the part from Indonesia but envisaged it as an independent state. Differences and differences with the cardinal authorities that finally made the cardinal authorities to allow the Aceh state a Particular Region position and giving control over instruction, faith and adat ( customary ) jurisprudence.
9. However, benefits and powers of particular part position were non to the full implemented. Subsequent find of immense natural gas militias in 1970s in the country and blatantly unequal distribution of grosss, which favors of the national authorities in Jakarta, contributed to the formation of GAM in 1976 and unfastened opposition to the cardinal authorities. Aceh ‘s alone sense of individuality, based on cultural, cultural, economic lines, has reinforced a tradition of “ discreteness. ”
10. Aceh was comparatively free of struggle for many old ages, but jobs started once more when President Suharto ‘s new Order government began to escalate centralised regulation from Jakarta. Islamic organisations across Indonesia were capable to intuition or straight-out repression and there was small room for local political action. Matters worsened when the find of big crude oil resources in northern Aceh brought an even tighter clasp over the local economic system and political relations by outside elements.
11. Although the state experienced rapid economic growing from crude oil production, many Acehnese felt they received small benefit or were even worse off when they lost land and forest resources to do manner for industrial, plantation, and forestry developments. Internal migration from other parts of the state were seen as taking most of the new occupations, while generals, politicians, and well-connected concern people from Java was said to be skimmed off all the net incomes.
12. Free Aceh Movement or, Gerakin Aceh Merdeka ( GAM ) had been contending for independency and Islamic province in Aceh from 1976 to 2005. The devastation caused by armed struggle and 2004 Tsunami brought both parties to a peace dialogue that paved the manner to stop the insurgence. The insurgence was led by Hasan di Tiro with the
strength of 90,000 reserves and guerilla combatants in the country. In this survey, it was identified that figure of causes from which GAM was based on deriving the popular support in the state. Following are the chief causes of the insurgence:
a. Cultural differences.
B. Religious differences.
c. Unfulfilled outlooks.
13. During the period, a more conservative signifier of Islam than that of the mainstream pattern in most of Indonesia was widely practiced in Aceh. Besides, President Suharto ‘s authorities policy of advancing a incorporate Indonesian civilization was unpopular among most of the Aceh people that made difference more widened with cardinal. Further the geographical location of the state at the Western terminal of Indonesia made a widespread feeling in the state that leaders in distant Jakarta do non understand Aceh ‘s jobs and hold small understanding for the local demands and imposts. On the other manus lifting figure of Javanese migrators to Aceh and perceived unjust distribution of income from Aceh ‘s significant natural resources caused the insurrectionists to derive more popularity in the state. Based on popular support for other sensed and high discriminatory factors, the Free Aceh Movement could be identified in three stages.
PHASES OF THE CONFLICT
14. The Free Aceh Movement has gone through three phases as summarized below:
a. The first was at its birth in 1976 to the twelvemonth 1979 which it was wholly defeated by the authorities forces.
B. The 2nd stage from 1989 to the early 90s when it received support and preparation from foreign states.
c. The 3rd rise was a consequence of eventually deriving widespread support throughout Aceh as a consequence of contributions and extortion and a big group of possible soldiers who had lost relations in the old rebellion.
THE FIRST PHASE
15. During the first stage, from 1976 to 1979, GAM was a little, tightly knit, ideologically goaded organisation of 70 work forces led by a knowing elite comprising physicians, applied scientists, faculty members, and business communities. By the terminal of 1979, Indonesian counter insurgence operations had all but crushed GAM. Its leaders were either in expatriate, imprisoned, or dead ; its followings were dispersed and pushed resistance.
16. Due to the so President Suharto ‘s unpopular policies and unequal societal and economic interventions, Hasan di Tiro formed the Free Aceh Movement on 4 Thursdaies December 1976 and declared the Acehnese independency and identified him as the leader of the motion. The first stage of the motion was about wholly unsuccessful as the authorities wholly neutralized the same by 1977.
17. The early GAM attempts were chiefly directed at addition control over crude oil production and distribution which was the chief industry in the state. GAM ab initio focused on local Exxon Mobil gas works which belonged to American transnational oil and Gas Corporation. Same clip GAM Commander Hasan Di Tiro had connexions with the crude oil industry and he bid, via a stamp procedure, to acquire a contract to construct a gas grapevine which was beaten by the gas giant Bechtel. The Bechtel Corporation ( Bechtel Group ) is the largest building and technology company in the United States. The ground for this failure was a deficiency of popular support from both within Ache and from international beginnings. President Suharto was favored by states such as America due to his anti communist policies during the Cold War period.
THE Second PHASE
18. The group renewed its activities in the 1989, seemingly with fiscal support from Libya and Iran, with preparation for around 1,000 soldiers. This preparation from abroad meant that GAM soldiers were much more organized and better trained that of the old insurgence. Government placing the new menace, Aceh was declared as an “ country of particular military operations ” ( Daerah Operasi Militer ) or DOM in 1989. Particular counter insurgence military personnels were sent in and 2nd stage of counter insurgence began. Villages that were suspected of harbouring GAM secret agents were reported to be burnt down and household members of suspected activists were kidnapped and tortured. Amnesty International called the military response “ daze therapy ” and it was believed that 7000 human rights abuse incidents were reported during DOM. GAM forces have besides been accused of Human Rights maltreatments. Extra judicial executings of suspected military sources and aiming of civilian substructure such as schools have both been attributed to GAM operations.
19. In 1996 the Indonesian authorities announced the terminal of GAM as the counter-insurgency operations had efficaciously destroyed GAM as a guerrilla force. At the terminal of the insurgence, lasting GAM members were forced to conceal in Malaysia.
THE THIRD PHASE
20. After the autumn of President Suharto ‘s disposal in 1998 and the determination of his replacement President Jusuf Habibie to retreat military personnels from Aceh as portion of democratic reform gave infinite for GAM to re-establish itself once more in the Aceh. GAM started to enrolling young persons by working favoritism of Acehnese by Indonesian military. Increasing force begun by GAM Rebels against authorities functionaries and Nipponese occupants in 1999. They obtained arms by smuggling from Thailand. This rebellion led to an addition in military presence. Troop Numberss are believed to hold risen during the regulation of Megawati Sukarnoputri. In 2001-02 the combination of military and police forces in Aceh had grown to about 30,000. During one twelvemonth clip this figure jumped to 50,000 operating in what the International Crisis group called, “ a practical legal vacuity ” . The security crackdowns during this clip resulted in several thousand civilian deceases estimated to be about 15000.
21. The Indonesian authorities launched a big offense in Aceh against the GAM in 2003-2004 and observed some success. The 2003-2004 Indonesian offense in Aceh against the Free Aceh Movement ( GAM ) separationists was launched on 19th May 2003 and lasted about one twelvemonth. It followed a two-week ultimatum to GAM to accept particular liberty under Indonesian regulation. It was one of the Indonesian armed forces ‘s largest runs since, 1975 invasion of East Timor. It badly disabled the rebel motion, and along with the 2004 Indian Ocean temblor with tsunami brought the 30 twelvemonth struggle in Aceh to an terminal coercing both parties to negociate on common apprehension and state rebuilding.
22. Organizational Structure of the GAM can be stated as follows:
a. Top leading.
B. Midlevel leading.
e. Support base in Aceh.
23. As GAM sees itself as the exclusive legitimate representative of the Acehnese people it has sought to set up governmental establishments. The first cabinet, set up by Hasan di Tiro during his clip in Aceh from 1976 to 1979, was composed as follows:
a. Teungku Hasan di Tiro: wali negara, defence curate, and supreme
b. Dr. Muchtar Hasbi: vice-president ; curate of internal personal businesss.
c. Tengku Muhamad Usman Lampoih Awe: curate of finance.
d. Tengku Haji Iljas Leube: curate of justness.
e. Dr. Husaini M. Hasan: curate of instruction and information.
f. Dr. Zaini Abdullah: curate of wellness.
g. Dr. Zubir Mahmud: curate of societal personal businesss.
h. Dr. Asnawi Ali: curate of public plants and industry.
i. Amir Ishak: curate of communications.
j. Amir Rashid Mahmud: curate of trade.
k. Malik Mahmud: curate of province.
23. This motion had three chief beginnings of roll uping financess. They are as follows:
a. snatch, Crime and drugs. Young adult females dating with Indonesian soldiers pupils believed to be TNI betrayers, 49 journalists accused of colored coverage, and small town caputs in demand of being either local legislators, business communities, oil workers.
B. Foreign contributions. From states like Libya, Iran, and some of EU states.
c. Taxation. From all component of socity, merchandisers, contractors, Scholl instructors.
GROWTH OF MILITARY FORCE
24. The GAM growing to a big seditious organisation. In 1976 when GAM was established it comprised merely 70 guerilla combatants. In 2003 it had guerrilla ground forces of 30,000 and a modesty of about the whole population of Aceh. In add-on they had locally trained about 30,000 carders including a few 100 adult females. Harmonizing to di Tiro among these 30,000, an estimated 5,000 GAM guerilla were trained in Libya between 1986 and 1989. In Libya at the terminal of each class there was a graduation ceremonial in Tripoli at which Libyan functionaries like President Muammar Gadhafi were present.
25. There arms were a mixture of rakitan ( place made ) and standard pieces. Domestically, weaponries were captured, stolen, or purchased from the TNI and the constabulary. In 2001 they had following arms:
a. 1,000 to 1,500 modern pieces, harmonizing to the perceivers.
B. Few grenade launchers.
c. Fewer rocket-propelled grenade launchers.
d. One or two 60 millimeter howitzers.
26. These arms were spread unevenly over GAM s district. Most of these weaponries concentrated in the traditional GAM countries of, North Aceh, East Aceh Pidie. Following are the indicant of nexus to the International weaponries smuggling by GAM:
a. In May 2001, Thai police intercepted an weaponries cargo intended for Aceh dwelling of 15,500 slugs, 16 kilo-grams of TNT explosive, 60 grenades, and 48 landmines packed in wooden boxes.
B. In July 2002 Thai constabularies seized a boat transporting weaponries on its manner to Aceh. The arms consisted of 68 AK-47s, 5 RPD machine guns, 221chains of AK-47 slugs, and 67 boxes of AK-47 bullets.69 Furthermore, this was the 2nd arms ictus within a month. In the first one Thai constabulary found 6 rocket-propelled grenades, 2 M-67 grenades, and about600 AK-47 slugs. While accurate Numberss are hard to obtain these ictuss every bit good as arms captured provide a glance into GAMs armory.
STRATEGY, TACTICS AND TARGETS
27. GAM ‘s scheme is one of guerilla warfare, doing usage of its superior cognition of the terrain and the population to compensate its deficiency of existent military capacity. In many ways AGAM/TNA has had the operational advantage of being able to contend elusively and taking the topographic point and clip of battle.
28. The purpose of GAM ‘s scheme is to do Aceh indocile in order to do Indonesia pay the highest monetary value possible for keeping of this district.
29 GAM ‘s operations have focused on five distinguishable marks in Aceh as follows:
a. Indonesian political constructions.
B. The province instruction system.
c. The economic system.
d. The Javanese.
e. The Indonesian security forces.
ATTACKS AGAINST SECURITY FORCES
30. Harmonizing to constabulary figures, 53 police officers were killed from July to December 1999 and many more were injured. The constabulary spokesman, Inspector-General Didi Widayadi, stated that the casualties between March 12 and April 12, 2001, included 33 military forces and 36 constabularies killed every bit good as 128military forces and 132 constabulary injured.98 Harmonizing to the TNI, between June 2000 and April 2001 some 50 soldiers were killed while 206 were injured and 8 were listed as losing. In fact, despite its ain losingss, GAM continued to bring down important loss on the security setup soldiers were killed and another 136 wounded between May 2001 and April 2002.
Tacticss USED BY ACEH INSURGENTS
31. Hasan di Tiro described a scope of GAM tactics in the late 1970s “ assailing the enemy posts that are objectionable to us ” , scuppering military personnels, seting bombs and establishing grenades near military installings, put to deathing off-duty security forces, interrupting “ enemy communicating lines, ” and stoping and destructing Indonesian military vehicles.
32. They over come their deficiency of firepower and preparation slightly through its extended net work of betrayers with good communications able to supply intelligence and early warning of the motions of the constabulary and TNI. They employed squad and platoon-sized groups ( 10-30 people ) . As one GAM operational commanding officer explained: “ When they advance, were handling ; when they leave, we return. When they grow tired or weak or careless, we attack ” . Another guerilla combatant has told that “ We do n’t hold to win the war, we merely have to halt them from winning ” .
33 As one of the leader Amni bin Marzuki and Kamaruzzaman explained in December 2001: Our operations are defensive, but this includes pre-emptive onslaught. If we have information that a station is traveling to be attacked, we attack foremost. We chiefly resort to scupper and hit-and-run. We ca n’t contend a frontal war. They have better equipment and more ammo. We merely have some Kalashnikovs and M-16s but we have to utilize ammo from Pindad. It has besides relied on regular ambuscades of convoys, foraies on military stations and composites, and onslaughts on single constabulary and soldiers.
34. From a military position there is no manner for us to get the better of them or for them to get the better of us. We want to bind down every bit many of their military personnels as possible in Aceh. We want them to pass more money on this operation. We want to wash up them financially. This is the thought of GAM high rank members.
35. In 1986 Libya agreed to give paramilitary preparation to the motion. During 2003 rank increased and expanded the control 70 to 80 per centum of state including local authorities through their shadow civil construction.
Major MILITARY OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY GOVERNMENT FORCES
36. In 1990 Indonesia launched its Jaring Merah ( Red Net ) pacification operations to cover with the renewed challenge. The whole period from 1989 until 1998 became known as DOM and was characterized by heavy handed military reprisals against small towns believed to supply logistical aid or sanctuary to the insurrectionists.
a. Leadership was safe in expatriate where it continued to do its instance for independency.
B. A important figure of GAM members including military commanding officers found safe oasis in neighbouring Malaysia where GAM continued to be as an seditious motion among the refugees and supported by the Acehnese Diasporas.
c. The DOM experience gave rise to a whole new coevals of GAM.
37 1990s, the official nature of security operations in Aceh changed from that of a military offense to a run to reconstruct security and public order ( Operasi Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat ; Kamtibmas ) led by the constabulary. The armed forces besides conducted Operasi territorial.
38. By early January 1999, Indonesian security forces had launched afresh security device called Operasi Wibawa ( Operation Authority ) . Jakarta replaced this operation with consecutive operations code-named Operasi Sadar Rencong ( Operation Rencong Awareness ) I, II, and III until the terminal of 2000.
39. Between January and April 2001, another operation called Operasi Cinta Meunasah ( Operation Love the Mosque ) was launched. All these consecutive operations were chiefly meant to work as a constabulary run to reconstruct security and public order.
40. President Abdurrahman Wahid. issued Inpres 4/2001 consisted of a six-point program intended to turn to the job in Aceh in a comprehensive manner. As a effect of Inpres 4/2001, a new Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Penegakan Hukum or OKPH ( Operation for Restoring Security and Continuing the Law ) was launched. Security Recovery Operation was ( Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan ; Opslihkam ) , launched in April 2001.
41. On May 19, 2003. The authorities, through Presidential Decree ( Kepres ) 28/2003, decided to enforce soldierly jurisprudence across Aceh and get down what it calls Operasi Terpadu ( Integrated Operation ) in the state. With the failure of peace negotiations in Tokyo, Operasi Terpadu was officially launched on May 19, 2003. Operasi Terpadu aims to oppress the breakaway motion in Aceh. The authorities declared that the political end of Operasi Terpadu is to decide the Aceh job by achieving two specific aims: to eliminate GAM and to control Acehnese support for independency by “ winning the Black Marias and heads of the people. ”
42. Harmonizing to Major General Endang Suwarya, the soldierly jurisprudence decision maker, “ we have besides occupied their [ GAM ] strategic bases, destroyed their bid system and installations. ” By the terminal of the first six months of Operasi Terpadu, the armed forces claimed to hold killed 1,106 Rebels, arrested 1,544, forced 504 others to give up, and seized 488weapons ( about 30 per centum of GAM ‘s estimated arms ) . With these consequences, the military believes that after six months of intensive runing it has reduced GAM ‘s strength by 55 per centum. The armed forces besides claims that merely 273 out of 6,000 small towns are non under the control of security forces. During that period, nevertheless, some 395 civilians died due to the struggle and 159 others were wounded. Despite the important decrease in GAM ‘s military strength, the military admits that it has non made important advancement in capturing or killing GAM ‘s leaders. The TNI has killed or captured merely 37 out of 140 GAM leaders, largely the minor 1s. The cardinal leaders such asMuzakkir Manaf ( GAM commanding officer ) , Darwis Jeunib ( commanding officer of Jeunib ) , SofyanDawood ( GAM spokesman ) , and Ishak Daud ( commanderof Peurelak ) remain at big.
Analysis OF THE CONFLICT
POLITICAL PRIMACY AND POLITICAL AIM
43. When it is studied the battle lasted for several decennaries in Aceh, it can be observed that the importance of the bing authorities political primacy and political purpose affect on the insurgence. In the three stages of GAM ‘s battle, the organisation remained devoted to the political end of independency for Aceh even though Islam formed a portion of the political orientation of the GAM with Acehnese individuality and character it is non a sacredly focussed organisation. During the survey, we found that the motives behind the root causes that led the struggle retarding force over three decennaries are the demand for entree to the wealth generated from Aceh ‘s natural resources and the desire for the human right misdemeanors committed by the Indonesian Army during subsequent actions in order to extinguish the insurgence in the Aceh.
44. The bing authorities during the period did non much politically focused on this affair to work out it with political agencies instead than military agencies. But it required more than merely a military offenses designed to extinguish the insurgence. It shows that how military operation without clear scheme affects in developing the insurgence as this progressed for three stages for three decennaries. Having understood the importance of this, the bing authorities took necessary action to hold peace negotiations with the GAM in late 1890ss. The first duologue between GAM and so Indonesian authorities began during the presidential term of Abdurrahman Wahid. Official negotiations began in 2000, facilitated by a Swiss NGO despite the deterioration of the state of affairs in Aceh the negotiants agreed to a interruption in the force aimed at making a political solution to the struggle. Besides prior to the 2000 peace negotiations, bing authoritiess had passed a series of particular liberty Torahs, in effort to convey the struggle to a arrest but it had a small consequence in the state of affairs. Megawati Sukarnoputri ‘s authorities began new unit of ammunition of negotiations in 2002 failed in which the national authorities declared soldierly jurisprudence in Aceh and increased military operations. In this context it can be concluded that the bing authoritiess had non hold a political primacy and a clear political purpose.
Separating THE Insurgency FROM HIS SUPPORT
45. In counter insurgence operations, dividing the insurgence from his support another of import factor to be taken by the military agencies so that it can get the better of the insurrectionists by winning the Black Marias and heads of the people. In Aceh military had taken a different class. They treat all the Acehnese as possible members of GAM till the clip they prove them egos. They besides conducted a barbarous pacification run with no respect for human right. The run can be significantly divided in to four features. First, the military launch “ daze therapy ” which means a run of panic designed to distribute out fright in the population and do them retreat support for the GAM. The authorities was able to accomplish it but the effects were lay waste toing the Acehnese.
46. Thousands of Acehnese became the victims of drumhead executing, arbitrary apprehension, anguish, colza and disappearing. The worst portion of the authorities military scheme was the dumping of unidentified cadavers at waysides and public markets, largely shot in the caputs. Second, the armed forces ‘s scheme was to mobilise civilians in the signifier of small town reserves to back up the counter insurgence operations. Thousands of villagers have been forced to take part in the Hunt for GAM members. Third, the most common of this scheme was the enlisting of local people to function as the reserves ‘s undercover agents and betrayers. This resulted in spread out the intuition, created the tensenesss and generated struggles among the Acehnese. In facts the period was marked by a serious of killing of sources to the military. Fourth, the armed forces besides conducted Operasi Teritorial ( Territorial Operations ) that included Operasi Bhakti in which the ground forces administered rural development and substructure plans. This operation intended to win the Black Marias of the people and that was centered in countries where GAM had a strong presence.
NEUTRALIZING THE INSURGENT
47. When it is analyzed the Operasi Territorial which was initiated by the military while carry oning the violative operation in 1990, it seemed that the plans were good supported by the people, even though villagers had frequently been forced to take part in these plan which resulted in dividing the insurrectionists and besides deployed 1000s of military personnels in pacification offense aimed at neutralizing the GAM. Furthermore, the authorities and the military labeled GAM as a “ pack of peace disturbers ” whose act consisting of robbery, killing of school kids and other Acts of the Apostless intended to make fright and upset the people. Subsequently it was launched the violative operation “ Operasi Terpadu ” which was introduced as its aims, construction and scheme dwelling with four major elements: a military operation to reconstruct security and order, a human-centered operation, a jurisprudence enforcement operation and an operation to reconstruct the maps of the bureaucratism. How of all time it is apparent from beginning that the military run as the chief constituents of the operation. The authorities imposed the soldierly jurisprudence in Aceh and same clip launched to the full scale military offense against the GAM from which the armed forces managed to cut down the strength of GAM. By 1992 Indonesian forces succeeded in their primary aim of neutralizing the military menace posed by the GAM to a considerable extent.
LONGER TERM POST INSURGENCY PLANING
48. Due to the monolithic devastation received in footings of both work forces and resources from the military run conducted by the Indonesian forces and the Tsunami in December 2004, both sides declared a armistice and re-initiated to decide the struggle. The peace negotiations were facilitated by a Finland based NGO and led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. That resulted in Signing a peace understanding on 15 August 2005. Under the understanding, Aceh would have particular liberty under Republic of Indonesia and non organic authorities military personnels would be withdrawn from the state go forthing 2500 soldiers and disarmament of GAM. As portion of the understanding, the European Union deployed 300 perceivers whose mission expired on 15 December 2006 after the local elections. Further Acehnese are allowed to set up local political parties to stand for their ain involvement. The most of import point to be considered is the protesting by the human rights advocators who demand that old human rights misdemeanors in the state needed to be addressed which has become the most controversial fact in this respect as it seems that the authorities is non traveling to turn to on the affair yet.
49. On the other manus, no effort been observed to do to turn to the root causes of the insurgence which create status for the Acehnese would once more hold no other pick than seeking damages of their regionalist grudges by usage of weaponries. It besides requires the creative activity of conditions that would do the thought of independency unattractive to the population at big. Past experience shows that a military operation without a clear issue scheme is bound to motivate yet another rhythm of insurgence. This issue scheme should necessitate non merely a comprehensive program for immediate rehabilitation and Reconstruction but besides long-run policy bundles aimed at originating local administration reform, developing Aceh ‘s economic system, reconstructing a sense of justness among the Acehnese, and advancing democracy in the state. Merely so can we anticipate the rhythm of insurgence and force in Aceh to stop.
INTELIGENCE AND INFORMATION
50. Due to the actions of Government military forces during old phases popular support was non towards the Government forces. Alternatively of wining the Black Marias and heads military cultivates the choler among the Aceh people about them. This led to do it hard to Government forces to acquaire information and intelligence. Since the insurrectionist from the same nationality they were able to protect them egos easy.
Coordinated GOVERNMENT MACHINERY
51. Different authoritiess address the issue in different signifiers. But preponderantly it was observed that all the authoritiess ‘ deficiency of co-ordinated Government machinery. Most of the times in 1990s military defeated the GAM really early. But, there was no co-ordinated authorities machinery to work the state of affairs. If it was at that place 3rd phase would non emerged. Therefore it can say that during this run planning
ROOTCUASES TO THE CONFLICT
52. The following issues have historically been viewed as of import factors lending to the struggle. Those factors are reflecting the order in which they foremost had a major impact on struggle kineticss and of import sustaining factors, which were non of import early on, but are important today.
a. Islam. Historically, the topographic point of Islam was one of import lending factor to the struggle. In the 1950s, a major end of Darul Islam was execution of Islamic jurisprudence, shari’ah. Early in the GAM rebellion, some GAM stuffs stressed Islamic demands. Today, Islam plays merely a secondary function. GAM says that it does non take at an Islamic province, while the GOI has moved to shore up Islamic support by leting the execution of facets of shari’ah.
B. Natural resources. The development of the Arun Fieldss into one of the universe ‘s largest beginnings of natural gas was an of import factor in the outgrowth of GAM in the seventiess. Most of the gas grosss were absorbed by the cardinal authorities, comparatively few local people were employed in the industry, and local communities were adversely affected by land disaffection, pollution and the negative effects of concerted development. Among other natural resources in the state, lumber was besides of import, non so much as a beginning of grudge but instead as a beginning of funding for both the Rebel motion and, particularly, the TNI, which is believed to deduce significant grosss from legal and illegal logging.
c. Human Rights. The human rights maltreatments committed by the TNI have been a major lending factor to the struggle. Maltreatments have greatly deepened disaffection with Jakarta and helped to bring forth support for the insurgence. A cardinal turning point was the alleged DOM ( Military Operations Zone ) period from 1990 to 1998 when about 3000 individuals were killed and when anguish, disappearing and colza became common. After the autumn of Suharto, the GOI recognized that maltreatments had taken topographic point, and promised to look into them, punish culprits and compensate victims. When these things did non go on satisfactorily, they prompted a hardening of attitudes in the Acehnese public. For illustration, some younger coevals pupil and other civil society militants ab initio used the demand for an independency referendum simply
as a bargaining bit to coerce Jakarta for human rights tests, but when this did non happen and the TNI reverted to its old methods, they became committed protagonists of independency. GAM propaganda topographic points great accent on human rights maltreatments, and many of GAM ‘s guerilla recruits are reportedly immature work forces whose household members were themselves victims.
d. Governance jobs. Corruptness and ineffectualness in both civilian authorities establishments and the armed forces have often been identified as major lending factors to the struggle. One Bank Indonesia study in 2001 identified Aceh as the “ most corrupt ” state in Indonesia. In recent old ages, Aceh has been rocked by a series of corruptness dirts, the best publicized of which resulted in the jailing for 10 old ages of the governor Abdullah Puteh.
d. Structural poorness. In the 1970s, Aceh had one of the lowest poorness rates in the state and comparatively strong societal indexs. The impact of drawn-out struggle, particularly since 1998, now means that Aceh ‘s figures are among the state ‘s worst. For case, in recent old ages, local authorities functionaries have said that 54 % of the population lived below the poorness line and that 1.2 million people in the state lived in unsuitable lodging. Poverty and related societal jobs perpetuate the struggle by intensifying generalised grudges in the population. The increasing Numberss of unemployed work forces were recruited into GAM ‘s guerilla ground forces.
53. Counter insurgence operations carried out in the Aceh have thought many lessons to the universe in countering the modern twenty-four hours insurgence, covering the facets of intent, kineticss, and effects of counter insurgence operations conducted in Aceh since 1990.
54. There have been many divergences from the recognized rules of countering the insurgence that has led to the contentions. Despite the fact that the job in Aceh is political and an armed insurgence, the counter insurgence operation carried out in the Aceh, frequently deviated from the rules of pacification, particularly during the period of DOM ( 1990-98 ) when the military conducted Operation Red Net to extinguish the Rebels.
55. Alternatively of winning Acehnese Black Marias and heads, the military planted seeds of hatred among the general population through barbarous suppression and inordinate usage of force. Indeed, the human rights maltreatments committed by military forces during this period have deepened Acehnese bitterness against the cardinal authorities. The pacification operation in Aceh in the 1990s besides shows that a drawn-out military violative easy led to maltreatments that perpetuated, instead than eradicated, the aspiration for independency.
56. Part of the job was the absence of a clear issue scheme after the military aim of the mission was accomplished. Military additions were non followed by Reconstruction steps that would hold restored normalcy in the state and improved life conditions. During the DOM period, the armed forces had really managed to reconstruct order and by 1992 had undermined the military strength of the Rebels. But, on the stalking-horse that the state was non wholly unafraid, Operation Red Net continued until 1998. Aceh ‘s position as a military operations zone was non lifted until the autumn of Suharto ‘s government.
57. Not merely were at that place barely any important betterments in the societal and economic conditions of the state, but the province ‘s hegemonic presence in Aceh, in the signifier of military dominance, had reinforced public bitterness against the province itself, particularly against the military. Nor have public perceptual experiences that Aceh has been the victim of inordinate development by the cardinal authorities been adequately addressed by Jakarta. When the bitterness gained new impulse with the prostration of the military-backed Suharto government, it shortly resurfaced in the signifier of armed insurgence.
58. The military operation, which began on May 19, 2003, had the same destiny. Attainment of the political aim of Operasi Terpadu-curbing Acehnese support for independency and deciding the Aceh job was merely possible when the authorities succeeds in winning the Black Marias and heads of the people and this requires a clear military issue scheme and socio-economic Reconstruction.
59. The error of military operations in the 1990s, which continued indefinitely, should non be repeated. Once the military aim of Operasi Terpadu was achieved, civilian authorization should be restored in Aceh. A drawn-out military operation, while it might cover a farther blow to GAM ‘s military strength, might besides protract bitterness toward cardinal regulation from Jakarta. Although Operasi Terpadu was able to sabotage the military strength of the Rebels, it was non sufficient to decide the job of Aceh. Despite the authorities ‘s good purposes, this operation was improbable to run into its ultimate end of deciding the Aceh job one time and for all.
60. A comprehensive declaration of Aceh ‘s insurgence job required more than merely a military offense designed to oppress GAM. It besides required the creative activity of conditions that would do the thought of independency unattractive to the population at big. Past experience shows that a military operation without a clear issue scheme is bound to motivate yet another rhythm of rebellion. This issue scheme should imply non merely a comprehensive program for immediate rehabilitation and Reconstruction but besides long-run policy bundles aimed at originating local administration reform, developing Aceh ‘s economic system, reconstructing a sense of justness among the Acehnese, and advancing democracy in the state.
61. The Aceh struggle was one of the long lasted rebellion motion in Asia. When the memoranda of understanding between the Government of Indonesia and GAM was eventually signed on 15 August 2005 in Helsinki, Finland, The understanding brought an terminal to the about 30 old ages of bloody armed struggle that claimed 15.000 lives, 1000s of displaced and impacted the whole state economically, politically every bit good. Many believed that GAM had to be eliminated by using military operations. However, it was apparent that the military options were uneffective to extinguish rebellion. Alternatively, the military maltreatments have merely increased the GAM ‘s public support. The Helsinki peace understanding appeared as a better opportunity to set an terminal to the separationist struggle in Aceh. This colony has so far worked good. However, lessons learned from this struggle will be good for any authorities and the military in managing struggles.
62. The lessons learned from the past suggest that military operations were non the reply since the cardinal causes of the Acehnese grudges were non decently solved. On the other manus, GAM.
63. Leaderships must understand that their attempts to divide from the Republic of Indonesia by any manner, either democratic or non democratic agencies that an armed rebellion will neglect. In other manner, no individual state supported GAM ‘s demand for independency. Therefore, GAM leaders must be realize and work within the democratic province of Indonesia. So, it is clear that the 2005 Helsinki peace understanding was the best solution for the Aceh job.
64. Some believe that military operations under the 2003 soldierly jurisprudence succeeded in cut downing GAM ‘s military strength, and therefore forced GAM to the dialogue tabular array. One of the common perceptual experiences was that the military operations made GAM leaders more willing to negociate after the Tsunami. But, past experience suggests that military operations against GAM merely forced the Rebels to temporarily withdraw, and GAM had an ability to do another rejoinder with greater popular support. The monolithic presentation in Banda Aceh in 1999 showed us that the Acehnese supported GAM ‘s thought for entire independency through a referendum, or in other words, if the military one time once more defeated GAM militarily, there would be no warrant that GAM would non reemerge subsequently in clip. In fact, the GAM leader Hasan Tiro is populating in expatriate, doing it hard to get the better of GAM militarily.
65. The chief fact to win the struggle, the authorities and particularly the armed forces has to win the Black Marias and heads of the people. The military seemingly ignored the fact that the inordinate usage of force could exchange the penchants of the population. Many Acehnese considered the Indonesian ground forces as the enemy since the military operations damaged the civil life. It was clear that military operations were non the solution for the Aceh struggle since the armed forces was unable to win the people ‘s Black Marias and heads. The root causes of the struggle were non military affairs, but economic, societal, and political every bit good as assorted injustice policies. Furthermore, the authorities and particularly the military must retrieve that military steps can non stand entirely. They have to be combined with other actions such as jurisprudence enforcement, human-centered assistance, beef uping local authorities and economic betterment to turn to the Acehnese grudges.
66. The survey derived undermentioned recommendations:
Wining bosom and head of the local population.
B. The land troop of the authorities forces should be good disciplined and adhered to regulations and ordinance of the Opss.
c. The authorities should be able to place and divide the insurrectionists from the population.
d. The authorities should be after the op harmonizing to HR and establishment a good relationship with foreign media and state.
e. The authorities should halt any outside intervention spec weaponries smuggling to the struggle country.
f. Propaganda and psychological operations should be able to portray positively all the op in order to protect the good image of the govt.
g. Distribution of wealth should be equal and para in order to equilibrate the degree of the development to avoid any dissatisfaction among locals towards federal govt.
h. Any insurgence should be identified and prevent at the early phase.
i. Demobilization of the battlers under the footings of the understanding will necessitate to be rehabilitating by targeted plans to supply them with meaningful employment and besides to revive the victim small town ‘s economic system more loosely.